The purpose of this paper is to estimate the e¤ect of foreign ownership on productivity under reasonable identi…cation assumptions. In particular we estimate dynamic Cobb-Douglas production functions augmented with a set of variables capturing complementary characteristics of foreign ownership. We apply the GMM-System estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) to a large sample of …rms located in Italy. Our aggregate …ndings suggest that after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and measurement errors, foreign ownership has no e¤ect on productivity. Therefore we do not …nd widespread empirical support to the standard internalization theory of foreign direct investment. However, we also …nd that nationality matters since …rms under US ownership tend to be more productive than …rms under national ownership. In turn this additional result suggests that the transfer of knowledge implied by the internalization theory occurs only if the di¤erence between the recipient and the investment country is su¢ciently pronounced.
Introduction
The existence of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) and the characteristics of their foreign a¢liates have been extensively examined by the economic literature. The most widely accepted theory on MNEs, the so-called "internalization theory" (see Caves, 1996) , provides some insights to both issues. In fact, it suggests that MNEs exist as they can exploit in foreign markets superior knowledge (managerial expertise, superior technological skills, etc.) which compensates for the higher costs induced by operating in a foreign environment. In turn, MNEs' foreign a¢liates will bene…t from the transfer of this knowledge and might therefore display higher productivity and pro…tability levels with respect to domestic-owned …rms. The alleged superior performance of MNEs' subsidiaries compared with domestic-owned …rms has been widely documented in early empirical works, mostly using cross sectional data, and has become a "stylised fact" in the literature on MNEs (Conyon et al., 2002) .
It is however unclear whether this "stylised fact" can be interpreted as a causal or structural relationship between being owned by a MNE and being more productive or pro…table. In fact, simple cross section evidence can be criticised on the ground of composition e¤ects, …rms' heterogeneity and estimation issues. Firstly, MNEs tend to concentrate in high R&D and advertising spending sectors so that they might be more productive simply because they operate in higher productivity sectors. Secondly, …rms are heterogeneous (in terms of age, size, capital intensity, input and managerial quality, and the like) and these characteristics might a¤ect …rms' productivity. In so far as …rms' characteristics are observable, they can be used as control variables to assess the e¤ect of foreign ownership on productivity. However, if some of the characteristics are unobservable (e.g. managerial quality) then non-trivial estimation issues arise. In particular, if unobservables are correlated with regressors, then simple ordinary least squares are biased and incon-sistent. Thirdly, estimation problems might also arise because of simultaneity and measurement errors which are both very likely to occur in the context of production function.
This paper contributes to the recent literature on MNEs' a¢liates performance by applying appropriate micro econometric techniques to a specially constructed panel of …rms located in Italy and sampled in the 1992-99 period. In particular, we estimate dynamic gross output production functions by using the GMM-system technique recently developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) . In doing so, we are able to recover consistent estimates of the impact of foreign ownership on productivity, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and measurement error.
Our aggregate …ndings suggest that once potential endogeneity problems are controlled for, any systematic di¤erence between foreign a¢liates and domestic …rms disappears. This result contrasts with the view that, everything else equal, foreign ownership induces higher productivity levels. However, we also …nd that the country of origin matters as …rms under US ownership outperform domestic-owned …rms. This …nding gives empirical support to the hypothesis that the transfer of knowledge occurs only if the gap between host (Italy) and home (US) countries is su¢ciently pronounced.
The paper unfolds as follows. The next section motivates this paper by reviewing the theoretical literature and the empirical evidence on MNEs' productivity di¤er-entials with respect to domestic …rms. Section 3 presents our empirical model while Section 4 describes our sample and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 5 comments upon the results whereas Section 6 concludes. An appendix describing the sample used in this paper is also included.
Previous Literature
The internalisation -or transaction cost -theory of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) explains the existence of MNEs in terms of some, possibly intangible, assets owned by these …rms which compensate them for the higher costs implied by operating abroad (Caves, 1996) . In fact, in order to compete in foreign markets, where local …rms have better knowledge of local markets, consumer preferences and business practices, MNEs must enjoy some other speci…c advantages, such as superior managerial expertise or technological capabilities. These assets (so-called "proprietary assets") are mostly intangible and are more likely to be transferred e¢ciently through internalisation and expansion abroad than through markets mechanisms.
In turn, the internalisation theory suggests that MNEs' foreign subsidiaries will bene…t from the transfer of proprietary assets and therefore might display higher productivity or pro…tability levels compared to local …rms.
The empirical literature has tried to shed light on this issue. Early empirical work, mostly based on cross section data, has reached the consensus that foreign a¢liates have higher productivity levels (measured as gross output or value added per employee) and pay higher wages than domestic …rms. As pointed out by Caves (1996, pp. 185-6) , this is hardly surprising since "companies do not become multinationals unless they are(were) good at something". He also points out that the crucial question to be answered is therefore whether productivity advantages "are endogenous to the market-structure environments in which they emerge" or whether they have a "pure residual component".
On the one hand, the superior performance of MNEs' a¢liates might in fact be due to the so-called "composition e¤ect". As suggested by the internalization theory of FDI, MNEs tend to be concentrated in high R&D and advertising spending sectors where multinationals are more likely to possess proprietary assets that can be transferred to local subsidiaries. As foreign a¢liates might be more productive simply because they operate in higher productivity sectors, their relative performance must be assessed controlling for industry di¤erences. For instance, Davies and Lyons (1991) report that half of the 40% superior productivity of MNEs located in the UK compared with local …rms is simply due to this composition e¤ect, MNEs being concentrated in high value added per employee industries.
On the other hand, recent theoretical models developed in the Industrial Organization literature have shown how heterogeneity (in terms of age, size, capital intensity, input and managerial quality, and the like) a¤ects …rms' productivity. 1 Therefore, the higher productivity of MNEs' subsidiaries might be simply due to their di¤erent characteristics. Following this argument some authors have assessed the relative performance of foreign a¢liates controlling for observable characteristics. Globerman et al. (1994) , analyse a cross section of Canadian establishments and …nd that those owned by MNEs show a higher value per employee than domestic ones even controlling for industry e¤ects. However, once the authors control for capital intensity, size and workforce composition MNEs' superior performance disappears. A di¤erent result is found by Doms and Jensen (1998) . By analysing a large cross section of US establishments they show that MNEs' subsidiaries have 2.3 to 3.7% higher total factor productivity than domestically owned establishments, even after controlling for observable characteristics such as industry, size, age and state. Quite interestingly, they also …nd that foreign-owned establishments are lessand not more -productive than the subset of domestic-owned establishments owned by US …rms with overseas assets.
Finally, a more recent stream of literature has questioned the superior performance of MNE's a¢liates on methodological grounds. In fact, some individual characteristics are clearly unobservable (e.g. managerial quality) and hence they cannot be controlled for in cross section data. Furthermore, performance measures 1 For a recent review see for instance De Backer, 2001. such as total factor productivity (TFP) are obtained through estimation of production functions where problems of simultaneity and measurements errors usually occur. In fact, productivity shocks might be known by managers (but not by the econometrician) so that inputs are adjusted accordingly. In addition to this, input factors, especially capital, are prone to measurement error. As it is well known, these features make ordinary least squares estimates biased and inconsistent.
To deal with some of the aforementioned methodological issues, recent work has estimated augmented production functions by using appropriate panel data techniques. The results of this scarce literature are mixed. Gri¢th (1999a Gri¢th ( , 1999b applies the same econometric estimation technique used in this paper and tests whether foreign-owned UK plants in the car industry have higher levels of TFP than domestic-owned plants. She …nds that -despite the fact that foreign-owned establishments have higher output and value-added per worker -these di¤erences are largely explained by di¤erent levels of factor usage and labor quality, so that di¤erences in TFP between foreign and domestic-owned plants are very low and statistically insigni…cant. A rather di¤erent conclusion is reached by Girma et al. (2001) who apply random e¤ect techniques to a cross-industry panel of UK …rms.
They report that foreign a¢liates display higher TFP levels, and signi…cantly so, than domestic …rms. Quite interestingly, after splitting by country of origin, US …rms are found to be the most productive …rms in the sample, whereas Japanese companies are not statistically di¤erent from domestic-owned …rms.
Mixed results are also provided by those studies focussing directly on the impact of foreign acquisitions. Conyon et al. (2002) collect data on UK …rms acquired by foreign companies before and after the acquisition occurs. Results from …xed-e¤ect estimates show that …rms acquired by foreign companies experience a 14% signi…cant increase in labor productivity in the period following the acquisition.
However, their result can be criticised as the performance comparison is based on a partial productivity measure, even if the authors control for capital intensity. A very di¤erent result is found by Harris and Robinson (2002) who analyse a large cross-industry sample of UK plants observed in the 80s and the 90s. Not only foreign companies are found to acquire the most productive plants but, after the acquisition, the performance of these plants is also found to deteriorate.
Summing up, there is overwhelming empirical evidence suggesting a positive statistical association between foreign ownership and productivity. However, more recent work, where endogeneity problems are controlled for, casts more than a passing doubt on whether this association can be given a causal or structural interpretation. In this paper we contribute to this strand of research by providing novel empirical evidence based on a large panel of manufacturing …rms located in Italy.
The way we control for endogeneity issues is described in the next section.
The Model
We consider the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
L¯l it K¯k it i = 1; 2; :::; N; t = 1; 2; :::T
where Y it , M it , L it , K it denote respectively production, consumption of materials and services, employment and capital stock of …rm i at time t. The productivity term A it is modelled as follows:
(2)
where O it is a neutral shift variable capturing the type of ownership (domestic or foreign) which potentially can vary both over time and across …rms, ± t is a time speci…c intercept,´i is the individual e¤ect which in the present context can be thought of as unobserved …rm characteristics -such as managerial quality and structure -that can be viewed as constant over the sample period, and u it is the idiosyncratic error. In turn u it is made by a …rst order autoregressive productivity shock, v it and by a serially uncorrelated measurement error, s it . By using equations (2), (3) and (4) and by taking logs, equation (1) can be rewritten in the following dynamic representation:
where y it , m it , l it , and k it are the logarithms of
Finally, equation (5) is equivalent to:
and
As stated in the previous section the main purpose of this paper is to recover consistent estimates of the expected e¤ect on productivity of a change in the type of ownership, holding all other variables …xed. To achieve this goal, reasonable identi…cation assumptions have to be made. In particular, it seems sensible to assume that both input factors (m it ; l it ; k it ) and type of ownership (O it ) are correlated with the individual e¤ect (´¤ i ) as well as with past and present idiosyncratic error terms (w it ). In particular, this allows for the possibility that …rm heterogeneity and idiosyncratic productivity shocks -if observable to potential investors even if not to the econometrician -matter in attracting foreign investors.
As shown in Arellano and Bond (1991) , the following assumptions on the initial conditions:
E(x i1 e it ) = E(x i1 s it ) = 0 for t = 2; :::; T where
E(x it¡s ¢w it ) = 0 for t = 4; :::; T and 3 · s · t ¡ 1
In turn this allows the exploitation of t ¡ 3 and earlier levels of the variables as instruments once equation (6) has been …rst-di¤erenced to eliminate the individual e¤ect,´¤ i . 2 Unfortunately the resulting …rst-di¤erenced GMM estimator has been shown to have poor …nite sample properties when the lagged levels of the series are only weekly correlated with subsequent …rst di¤erences (Blundell and Bond, 1998) .
Furthermore, this has been found to be the case in the context of Cobb-Douglas production functions where the marginal processes for input factors are typically highly persistent. 3 Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest that in this case dramatic reductions in …nite sample biases can be gained if one is willing to assume that:
E(¢n it´¤ i ) = 0 for n = m; l; k; O and t = 2; :::; T and E(¢y i2´¤ i ) = 0
Under these restrictions 5 £ (T ¡ 3) additional moment conditions are available:
This allows the use of twice lagged …rst di¤erences of the variables as instruments for the equation in level. Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest to exploit both sets of moment conditions in (7) and in (8) 
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our empirical work exploits the "Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano-Reprint database"
(CLA-Reprint database henceforth) which provides information on foreign ownership as well as balance sheet data for a large sample of …rms located in Italy.
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In particular, the CLA-Reprint database reports information on foreign ownership and -when available -balance sheet data for all manufacturing …rms located in Italy and owned by a foreign company for at least one year in the 1992-99 period.
As some of the …rms are not foreign-owned for the whole period they are observed, foreign ownership is identi…ed through a …rm-year dummy variable which is equal to one if the …rm is foreign-owned at the end of the year and zero otherwise. The database also includes balance sheet data for a random sample of domestic-owned manufacturing …rms observed in the same period.
For the purpose of the present paper, additional cleaning procedures have been followed. Firstly, we removed from the original sample …rms with unknown industry activity, as de…ned by the Nace three digit classi…cation. Secondly, we excluded observations with either missing or non-positive values for output, materials, and capital stock. We required a more stringent condition for employment and chose to keep only observations with more than 10 employees. The rationale here is that accounting information for very small …rms are unlikely to be very reliable. Thirdly, we applied a standard trimming procedure to the logarithmic …rst di¤erences of all the variables used in estimation and we excluded observations with values above 1 or below -0.5. Finally, given the requirements of the adopted econometric methodology we selected only …rms with at least four contiguous observations. Our …nal sample is made of 2,026 …rms with a number of contiguous observations ranging from 4 to 6 for a total of 10,324 observations (see Table 1 ). Table 2 and 3 present some features of foreign ownership in our sample. Firstly, foreign ownership accounts for approximately 39% of observations (see Table 2 ).
Notice that the same proportion does not apply to …rms as some of them change ownership either from domestic to foreign or viceversa over the sample period.
Secondly, the CLA-Reprint database also reports foreign owners' country of origin and the starting date of foreign ownership. These are two important pieces of information which can be exploited to shed additional light on the topic studied in this paper. On the one hand, it can be assumed that MNEs' country of origin may matter for their ability to possess or transfer proprietary assets to their a¢liates.
For instance, Japanese …rms are commonly viewed as having markedly di¤erent work practices and logistical systems (such as "just-in-time" inventory planning).
For this reason, we identi…ed the countries with larger shares of foreign ownership (in decreasing order, USA, Germany, France, and United Kingdom, see Table 2 ) and allocated the remaining countries into two groups: other EU countries and other non-EU countries (including Japan). The result is a set of six dummy variables, one for each of these (groups of) countries. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that the transfer of proprietary assets is not an instantaneous and once-forall phenomenon. Hence, a progressive performance improvement should be recorded as long as the number of years under foreign ownership increases. Therefore, we constructed an additional …rm-year dummy variable which takes the value of one if foreign ownership starts no more than …ve years before the observation year and zero otherwise. We label the observations for which this variable is strictly positive as "new" foreign …rms and the remaining observations as "old" foreign …rms. As shown in Table 2 , 24% of foreign observations are "new". If the transfer of the proprietary assets occurs and a¤ects …rms' performance, then "new" foreign …rms should display a lower productivity level than "old" ones. On the contrary, the lack of any systematic di¤erence between the two sets of observations provides indirect support to the hypothesis that foreign ownership "per se" does not a¤ect …rms' productivity. Table 3 , which shows the distribution of our sample among the 23 Nace two-digit sectors, reveals -in accordance with the internalisation theory of FDI -that foreign ownership is concentrated in "high tech" industries. In fact, the share of observations in high tech industries is much higher for foreign than for domestic ownership (56.54% vs. 27.08%). Compared with domestic ownership, foreign ownership is especially concentrated in chemicals (21.54% vs. 4.94%), medical equipment and measurement instruments (4.70% vs. 1.26%) and -to a lesser extent -in electrical machinery (7.48% vs. 3.87%) and motor vehicles (4.03% vs. 2.11%).
Inspection of
Finally, Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the econometric analysis, separately for domestic and foreign ownership. As unani-mously found in the literature, foreign …rms appear to be much larger (from four to …ve times) than domestic ones in terms of both output and inputs. As for labor productivity (measured as real output per worker), foreign …rms do outperform domestic ones both if one considers the mean (0.528 vs. 0.454) and the median (0.395 vs. 0.317). However, MNEs' subsidiaries appear to compensate, at least partially, the more productive use of labor with a more intensive use of other inputs. Both capital and material intensities are in fact higher for foreign …rms.
Summing up, our summary statistics con…rm some "stylised facts" on MNEs'
foreign a¢liates. They are larger than domestic …rms, they are concentrated in "high-tech" sectors and they display a higher labor productivity than domestic …rms. However, MNEs' subsidiaries are more capital intensive than local …rms.
The latter consideration suggests that the use of a partial productivity measure could be misleading and supports the use of a total productivity measure. This is performed in our analysis based on production function estimates, whose results are presented in the next section.
Results
Results from the estimation of the unrestricted version of the dynamic CobbDouglas production function in equation (6) that the computed coe¢cient is equal to zero. Table 5 shows the results for the basic model using earlier instruments dated t¡3
for the equations in …rst di¤erences and instruments dated t ¡ 2 for the equations in level. This choice of instruments is consistent with the orthogonality conditions stated in (7) and (8) respectively. In all columns the test statistics indicate that there is evidence of …rst but not of second order serial correlation. However, as can be seen by looking at columns 1 and 2, the Sargan statistics reject the validity of the complete set of instruments at the 5 per cent signi…cance level (but not at the one per cent). Once O(3; 5) and ¢O t¡2 are removed from the set of instruments the situation improves and the validity of this reduced set of instruments cannot be rejected even at the 5 per cent signi…cance level (see column 3). In all columns, punctual estimates of factor elasticities look reasonable, perhaps with the exception of the output to capital elasticity which is a little bit on the low side. 7 Furthermore, punctual estimates of scale elasticity point out to the presence of modest increasing returns to scale. More importantly for the purpose of the present paper, the long run (LR) ownership e¤ect is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero in all speci…cations.
In turn this implies that once controlled for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and measurement errors, we do not observe in the aggregate any "structural" e¤ect of foreign ownership on productivity.
As a mean of comparison, Tables 6 and 7 report the results we obtain when applying alternative estimation methods. In particular, Table 6 shows the results using earlier instruments dated t ¡ 2 for the equations in …rst di¤erences and instruments dated t ¡ 1 for the equations in level. This choice of instruments is valid if w it » MA(0). This obviously contradicts the assumptions made on the composite idiosyncratic error term in (5) unless the presence of measurement errors is ruled out. In all columns of Table 6 the validity of the choice of instruments is strongly rejected by the Sargan test of overidenty…ng restrictions. In turn, this result clearly points out to the presence of measurement errors. In Table 7 , OLS estimates are reported. As it is well known, the validity of this estimation method relies on the assumption that each component of the error term -including the time invariant individual e¤ect -is uncorrelated with all regressors in (5), clearly a very unlikely event in the present context. However, these estimates can still be informative to the extent they allow us to measure the statistical associations (as opposed to "structural" or "causal" relations) -unconditional to the unobservables -among our variables of interest. With this purpose in mind, in columns 1 and 2 the model is estimated without industry dummies which are instead included in columns 3 and 4. All equations show a positive and in most cases signi…cant relation between the type of ownership dummy and productivity. Furthermore, this statistical association turns out to be larger (3.9-4.6% versus 1.6-2.6%) and more signi…cant when industry dummies are not included, that is when the so-called composition e¤ect is not controlled for (see Davies and Lyons, 1991) . Tables 8 to 10 present additional evidence by allowing the coe¢cients on the ownership variable to di¤er according to economically meaningful criteria. 8 According to received theory it is in high-tech industries that multinationals are more likely to possess proprietary assets that can be transferred to local subsidiaries.
This prediction is tested in Table 8 where the e¤ect of ownership on productivity is estimated separately for foreign …rms located in high-tech (HT) as opposed to lowtech (LT) industries. Also, as already mentioned in the previous section, it might be argued that it takes some years for MNEs' proprietary assets to be transferred to foreign subsidiaries and, possibly more importantly, to be used e¢ciently. For this reason Table 9 allows the relevant coe¢cients to vary according to whether …rms are under foreign ownership by more (OLD) or less-equal than …ve years (NEW).
Finally, it has also to be taken into account that countries di¤er with respect to many economic aspects, including their distance from the technological frontier. To test whether this makes any di¤erence on the observed structural relation between ownership and productivity, Table 10 presents the results of our estimates which compare subsidiaries of US companies (US) with subsidiaries of companies located in other foreign countries (OT).
These additional empirical results can be summarized as follow. Firstly, punctual estimates suggest that foreign ownership has a positive e¤ect on productivity in high-tech industries and a negative e¤ect in low-tech-industries. However, as can be seen by looking at all columns in Table 8 , coe¢cients are imprecisely estimated.
Not only they are not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at any conventional statistical level, but their di¤erence is also not statistically signi…cant. Similar conclusions can be drawn by looking at Table 9 . In all speci…cations the coe¢cients on both "old" and "new" foreign …rms are negative but insigni…cant. Finally, and rather interestingly, in three out of four equations, we …nd that US foreign …rms tend to be signi…cantly more productive than domestic …rms. Moreover, the di¤erence be-tween US …rms and OT …rms is signi…cant in all models at the 10 per cent and in three out of four model at the 5 per cent signi…cance level.
6 Conclusions
Both received theory on multinational …rms and common wisdom point out that subsidiaries of foreign …rms should operate more e¢ciently than local …rms. However, this may occur for di¤erent reasons. Indeed, it may be explained by the fact the MNEs possess superior managerial and/or technological skills that can be transferred to their foreign a¢liates. However, it might also be the outcome of a preference for MNEs to acquire the best locals or to operate in the most productive industries. Finally, as pointed out by Gri¢th (1999a Gri¢th ( , 1999b ) it may simply be that both groups of …rms are drawn from the same distribution but only the best foreign owned …rms have chosen to locate in a given country.
To shed some light on this issue we have tried to recover the "structural" or "causal" e¤ect of foreign ownership on productivity by imposing only relatively mild restrictions on the initial conditions for the variables in our dynamic model.
In particular we have applied the GMM-System estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) which has allowed us to control for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and measurement errors.
The descriptive evidence presented in this paper suggests that the average foreign …rm is larger and more (labor) productive than the average domestic counterpart.
Furthermore, it is more likely to operate in high-tech industries. Obviously, these statistical associations do not necessarily imply a "causal" relation. Indeed our econometric results suggest that in the aggregate there is no "structural" relation 9 We run additional equations by splitting the OT …rms according the following list of countries: Germany, France, UK, Other EU Countries, Other non-EU Countries. We …nd zero e¤ects for all countries but "Other non-EU Countries" where a negative and signi…cant e¤ect is detected. These additional results are available from the authors upon request. at all. In plain words, this implies that the expected e¤ect on total factor productivity of a change from domestic to foreign ownership (regardless of nationality) is zero. This …nding holds even after allowing the "structural" e¤ect to di¤er between high-tech and low-tech industries or between "old" and "new" foreign …rms.
However our results are not completely negative since we also …nd that nationality matters. Rather interestingly, a positive and signi…cant e¤ect is found for …rms under US ownership but not for …rms under EU ownership. This in turn opens a policy relevant question on whether our results have to be interpreted as evidence of American multinationals being more skilled or better equipped to transfer their skills e¢ciently than their European counterparts. The following information on foreign-owned manufacturing …rms is available in the database: identi…cation number ("Partita IVA"), name, localisation and main industry of activity (NACE-Rev.1, …ve digit classi…cation) of the foreign owned company; name and country of origin of the foreign owner; starting date (and ending date, if any) of foreign participation; type of foreign participation (majority, joint, minority).
The CLA-Reprint database also contains balance sheet data for 1,600 foreignowned …rms as well as for a random sample of domestic-owned …rms. Balance sheet data have been retrieved from the on-line version of the Aida data-bank produced by Bureau Van Dijk. The on-line version includes data for the 6 most recent …scal years and provides information for more than 50,000 Italian manufacturing …rms.
The sample of domestic-owned …rms (4,846 …rms) has been selected by drawing a random sample of 5,000 …rms and by excluding foreign …rms from the random sample.
For the purpose of the present paper, additional cleaning procedures have been followed. Firstly, we removed from the original sample …rms with unknown industry activity, as de…ned by the Nace three digit classi…cation. This has been done in order to allow the use of three-digit price de ‡ators for output. Secondly, we excluded observations with either missing or non-positive values for output, materials, and capital stock. We required a more stringent condition for employment and chose to keep only observations with more than 10 employees. The rationale here is that accounting information for very small …rms are unlikely to be very reliable. Indeed, observations for the micro-…rms in the original sample show puzzling summary statistics for some of the variables (and especially for the capital stock). Thirdly, we applied a standard trimming procedure to the logarithmic …rst di¤erences of all the variables used in estimation and we excluded observations with values above 1 or below -0.5. In this case the purpose is to exclude form the sample …rms with anomalously high growth rates in absolute values. Finally, given the requirements of the adopted econometric methodology we selected only …rms with at least four contiguous observations. Our …nal sample is made of 2,026 …rms with a number of contiguous observations ranging from 4 to 6 for a total of 10,324 observations (see Table 1 ).
The Variables
The variables used in the estimation of the production function are output, materials, capital stock and labor.
Output is computed as the sum of sales, capitalised costs and the change of workin-progress and in …nished goods inventories. All variables are de ‡ated with the appropriate three digit production price index provided by the National Statistical Bureau (ISTAT).
Materials are computed as a Tornquist index of de ‡ated materials and services.
Materials equal purchases of materials net of the increase in raw material inventories.
Materials are de ‡ated with an aggregate price index for raw materials and services are de ‡ated with the GDP price index.
The capital stock is the real …xed capital stock (at the end of period) computed by a Perpetual Inventory Method with a constant rate of depreciation (6%). The benchmark at the …rst year is the accounting value as reported in the balance sheet; …xed investment is the di¤erence between the capital stock as reported in two contiguous balance sheets and the de ‡ator is the production price index for investment goods.
Labor is measured as the total number of workers at the end of the …scal year. 
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